Security
Giving roow a database credential is a real decision. This page says who you are giving it to, what roow keeps, where your data goes, and what is not done yet, so you can make it with the facts.
Who runs roow
- roow is run by Arvind Ram Anantharam, an individual, in Milpitas, California. It is not yet a company.
- Write to arvindram03@gmail.com about anything on this page. The same person reads it.
- The engine that enforces access, Gantry, is open source under Apache 2.0. The hosted service around it is not.
What roow holds
roow does not copy or sync your database. It reads it when an agent or job asks, and results pass through to whoever asked. This is everything it keeps:
- Database credentials are encrypted before they are stored and decrypted only in the request that connects with them. A copy of roow’s own database is not a copy of your credentials.
- Agent tokens are kept as a digest. The token is shown once, when it is made, and cannot be read back.
- Runs record what was asked, who asked, what the rules decided and how many rows it touched. Not the rows themselves. Everyone in the workspace can see them, and they are kept for as long as the workspace is.
- Files you or an agent save (exports, job output, and the preview of rows a held write would change) hold rows, and are encrypted at rest. Only people who can use the connection a file came from can see it, and it stays until someone deletes it.
- SSH keys for a jump host are encrypted like credentials, and the jump host’s own key is pinned the first time roow reaches it: if it changes, roow refuses to connect until an admin accepts the new one.
- The hashing key for redacted columns is one per workspace, encrypted like credentials, and never shown to anyone.
Where your data goes
- roow connects to your database from its own servers: the API runs on Railway in the US East region, the website on Vercel, and roow’s own database on Supabase.
- Rows an agent reads go to that agent, and so to your AI provider (Anthropic, OpenAI, Google and so on). Their terms decide what happens to them next. Redaction and stats only decide what reaches them.
- A write waiting for approval shows the rows it would change to whoever approves it, in roow and, if you connect it, in Slack. Redacted columns stay masked there too.
- The public website (not the app) uses Google Analytics to count visits. Nothing from your workspace or databases is sent to it.
- Nothing you connect is sold, shared or used to train anything. The privacy terms say so in full.
How access is enforced
- The AI is treated as untrusted. Each request is checked against rules set by an owner or admin, which the agent cannot see or change, before anything reaches your database.
- Connections start read-only. Writes need a named destination, are rolled back if they change more rows than allowed, and can wait for a person to approve them. Approving is not something an agent can do: it is not one of its tools.
- Redaction and stats only are enforced in the open-source engine, where you can read the code and the tests that try to get around them. Stats only stops accidental exposure, not someone set on comparing two answers; the docs say what each does and does not cover.
- Every request is recorded before it runs, refusals included.
Connect with the least access
roow’s rules are a second line. The first is the database itself: give roow a role that can reach only what it needs, and even a mistake in roow cannot reach further. Signing in with Supabase makes such a role for you. With a connection string, make one yourself:
PostgreSQL, Neon, Supabase
- Read-only, for one schema:
CREATE ROLE roow_reader LOGIN PASSWORD '...'; GRANT CONNECT ON DATABASE app TO roow_reader; GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA public TO roow_reader; GRANT SELECT ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA public TO roow_reader; ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES IN SCHEMA public GRANT SELECT ON TABLES TO roow_reader;
- To keep a column out at the database too, grant columns instead of the table:
GRANT SELECT (id, plan, created_at) ON public.users TO roow_reader. - To let agents write, grant only the tables they may change:
GRANT INSERT, UPDATE ON public.tasks TO roow_reader.
MySQL
- Read-only, for one database:
CREATE USER 'roow_reader'@'%' IDENTIFIED BY '...'; GRANT SELECT ON app.* TO 'roow_reader'@'%';
- Rotate the password whenever someone who could see it leaves, and update the connection in roow.
Keep the database off the internet
- A database with no public address can still be connected: give roow an SSH jump host on the same network and a key made just for it. roow reaches the database through that host, so the database only ever hears from inside its network.
- On the jump host, give that key a user that can forward to the database and nothing else, for example with
permitopen="db.internal:5432"andno-ptyin itsauthorized_keysline.
What is not in place yet
- No SOC 2 report or independent penetration test yet. Both come before roow asks anyone to rely on it for regulated data.
- The key that encrypts credentials lives in the server’s environment, not a key management service. Anyone who could read that environment could read the credentials.
- roow is run by one person, so there is no separation of duties yet.
- roow is new and changes quickly; the terms ask you to keep your own copy of anything you cannot recreate.
Report a vulnerability
- Email arvindram03@gmail.com with what you found and how to reproduce it. Please do not test against databases that are not yours.
- For the open-source engine, you can also open a private security advisory on GitHub.
- Fixes ship as soon as they are ready, and the changelog says what was fixed and which versions were affected.